Memory Systems

and Memory-Centric Computing Systems

Lecture 3a: Memory Reliability & Security

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14 June 2019

TU Wien Fast Course 2019





Carnegie Mellon

Future Memory Reliability/Security Challenges

Future of Main Memory

■ DRAM is becoming less reliable → more vulnerable

Large-Scale Failure Analysis of DRAM Chips


- Analysis and modeling of memory errors found in all of Facebook's server fleet
- Justin Meza, Qiang Wu, Sanjeev Kumar, and Onur Mutlu,
 "Revisiting Memory Errors in Large-Scale Production Data
 Centers: Analysis and Modeling of New Trends from the Field"
 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 2015.

[Slides (pptx) (pdf)] [DRAM Error Model]

Revisiting Memory Errors in Large-Scale Production Data Centers: Analysis and Modeling of New Trends from the Field

Justin Meza Qiang Wu* Sanjeev Kumar* Onur Mutlu Carnegie Mellon University * Facebook, Inc.

DRAM Reliability Reducing



Chip density (Gb)

Aside: SSD Error Analysis in the Field

- First large-scale field study of flash memory errors
- Justin Meza, Qiang Wu, Sanjeev Kumar, and Onur Mutlu,
 "A Large-Scale Study of Flash Memory Errors in the Field"
 Proceedings of the <u>ACM International Conference on</u>
 <u>Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems</u>
 (SIGMETRICS), Portland, OR, June 2015.
 [Slides (pptx) (pdf)] [Coverage at ZDNet]

A Large-Scale Study of Flash Memory Failures in the Field

Justin Meza Carnegie Mellon University meza@cmu.edu Qiang Wu Facebook, Inc. qwu@fb.com Sanjeev Kumar Facebook, Inc. skumar@fb.com Onur Mutlu Carnegie Mellon University onur@cmu.edu

Future of Main Memory

- DRAM is becoming less reliable → more vulnerable
- Due to difficulties in DRAM scaling, other problems may also appear (or they may be going unnoticed)
- Some errors may already be slipping into the field
 - Read disturb errors (Rowhammer)
 - Retention errors
 - Read errors, write errors
 - ...
- These errors can also pose security vulnerabilities

DRAM Data Retention Time Failures

- Determining the data retention time of a cell/row is getting more difficult
- Retention failures may already be slipping into the field

Analysis of Data Retention Failures [ISCA'13]

Jamie Liu, Ben Jaiyen, Yoongu Kim, Chris Wilkerson, and Onur Mutlu, "An Experimental Study of Data Retention Behavior in Modern DRAM Devices: Implications for Retention Time Profiling Mechanisms" Proceedings of the 40th International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA), Tel-Aviv, Israel, June 2013. Slides (ppt) Slides (pdf)

An Experimental Study of Data Retention Behavior in Modern DRAM Devices: Implications for Retention Time Profiling Mechanisms

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
Two Challenges to Retention Time Profiling

Data Pattern Dependence (DPD) of retention time

Variable Retention Time (VRT) phenomenon

Two Challenges to Retention Time Profiling


- Challenge 1: Data Pattern Dependence (DPD)
 - Retention time of a DRAM cell depends on its value and the values of cells nearby it
 - When a row is activated, all bitlines are perturbed simultaneously



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Data Pattern Dependence

- Electrical noise on the bitline affects reliable sensing of a DRAM cell
- The magnitude of this noise is affected by values of nearby cells via
 - □ Bitline-bitline coupling → electrical coupling between adjacent bitlines
 - □ Bitline-wordline coupling → electrical coupling between each bitline and the activated wordline



Data Pattern Dependence

- Electrical noise on the bitline affects reliable sensing of a DRAM cell
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
- Retention time of a cell depends on data patterns stored in nearby cells
 - → need to find the worst data pattern to find worst-case retention time
 - → this pattern is location dependent

Two Challenges to Retention Time Profiling

- Challenge 2: Variable Retention Time (VRT)
 - Retention time of a DRAM cell changes randomly over time
 - a cell alternates between multiple retention time states
 - Leakage current of a cell changes sporadically due to a charge trap in the gate oxide of the DRAM cell access transistor
 - When the trap becomes occupied, charge leaks more readily from the transistor's drain, leading to a short retention time
 - Called Trap-Assisted Gate-Induced Drain Leakage
 - This process appears to be a random process [Kim + IEEE TED'11]
 - Worst-case retention time depends on a random process
 → need to find the worst case despite this


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Modern DRAM Retention Time Distribution




Newer device families have more weak cells than older ones Likely a result of technology scaling

An Example VRT Cell



Variable Retention Time



More on Data Retention Failures [ISCA'13]

Jamie Liu, Ben Jaiyen, Yoongu Kim, Chris Wilkerson, and Onur Mutlu,
 "An Experimental Study of Data Retention Behavior in Modern DRAM Devices: Implications for Retention Time Profiling Mechanisms"
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An Experimental Study of Data Retention Behavior in Modern DRAM Devices: Implications for Retention Time Profiling Mechanisms

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Industry Is Writing Papers About It, Too

DRAM Process Scaling Challenges

Refresh


- Difficult to build high-aspect ratio cell capacitors decreasing cell capacitance
- · Leakage current of cell access transistors increasing

tWR

- Contact resistance between the cell capacitor and access transistor increasing
- · On-current of the cell access transistor decreasing
- Bit-line resistance increasing

VRT

· Occurring more frequently with cell capacitance decreasing









Industry Is Writing Papers About It, Too

DRAM Process Scaling Challenges


Refresh

Difficult to build high-aspect ratio cell capacitors decreasing cell capacitance.
 THE MEMORY FORUM 2014

Co-Architecting Controllers and DRAM to Enhance DRAM Process Scaling

Uksong Kang, Hak-soo Yu, Churoo Park, *Hongzhong Zheng, **John Halbert, **Kuljit Bains, SeongJin Jang, and Joo Sun Choi


Samsung Electronics, Hwasung, Korea / *Samsung Electronics, San Jose / **Intel








Refresh Overhead: Performance



Refresh Overhead: Energy



Most Refreshes Are Unnecessary

Retention Time Profile of DRAM looks like this:

64-128ms

>256ms

128-256ms

RAIDR: Eliminating Unnecessary Refreshes

64-128ms

>256ms


1.25KB storage in controller for 32GB DRAM memory

128-256ms

Can reduce refreshes by ~75%

→ reduces energy consumption and improves performance


RAIDR: Baseline Design



Refresh control is in DRAM in today's auto-refresh systems

RAIDR can be implemented in either the controller or DRAM


RAIDR in Memory Controller: Option 1



Overhead of RAIDR in DRAM controller:

1.25 KB Bloom Filters, 3 counters, additional commands issued for per-row refresh (all accounted for in evaluations)

RAIDR in DRAM Chip: Option 2




Overhead of RAIDR in DRAM chip:

Per-chip overhead: 20B Bloom Filters, 1 counter (4 Gbit chip)


Total overhead: 1.25KB Bloom Filters, 64 counters (32 GB DRAM)

RAIDR: Results and Takeaways

- System: 32GB DRAM, 8-core; SPEC, TPC-C, TPC-H workloads
- RAIDR hardware cost: 1.25 kB (2 Bloom filters)
- Refresh reduction: 74.6%
- Dynamic DRAM energy reduction: 16%
- Idle DRAM power reduction: 20%
- Performance improvement: 9%
- Benefits increase as DRAM scales in density




DRAM Device Capacity Scaling: Performance



RAIDR performance benefits increase with DRAM chip capacity

DRAM Device Capacity Scaling: Energy



RAIDR energy benefits increase with DRAM chip capacity

RAIDR: Eliminating Unnecessary Refreshes

Observation: Most DRAM rows can be refreshed much less often

without losing data [Kim+, EDL'09][Liu+ ISCA'13]

Key idea: Refresh rows containing weak cells more frequently, other rows less frequently




2. Binning: Store rows into bins by retention time in memory controller Efficient storage with Bloom Filters (only 1.25KB for 32GB memory)

3. Refreshing: Memory controller refreshes rows in different bins at different rates

different rates

Results: 8-core, 32GB, SPEC, TPC-C, TPC-H

- □ 74.6% refresh reduction @ 1.25KB storage
- □ ~16%/20% DRAM dynamic/idle power reduction
- □ ~9% performance improvement
- Benefits increase with DRAM capacity



 ≈ 1000 cells @ 256 ms

Refresh interval (s)

 ≈ 30 cells @ 128 ms

 $^{10}_{2}^{60}$ 100 10



More on RAIDR: Perf+Energy Perspective

Jamie Liu, Ben Jaiyen, Richard Veras, and Onur Mutlu, "RAIDR: Retention-Aware Intelligent DRAM Refresh" Proceedings of the 39th International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA), Portland, OR, June 2012. Slides (pdf)

RAIDR: Retention-Aware Intelligent DRAM Refresh

Jamie Liu Ben Jaiyen Richard Veras Onur Mutlu Carnegie Mellon University

Finding DRAM Retention Failures

- How can we reliably find the retention time of all DRAM cells?
- Goals: so that we can
 - Make DRAM reliable and secure
 - Make techniques like RAIDR work
 - → improve performance and energy

Mitigation of Retention Issues [SIGMETRICS'14]

Samira Khan, Donghyuk Lee, Yoongu Kim, Alaa Alameldeen, Chris Wilkerson, and Onur Mutlu,

"The Efficacy of Error Mitigation Techniques for DRAM Retention

Failures: A Comparative Experimental Study"

Proceedings of the <u>ACM International Conference on Measurement and</u> <u>Modeling of Computer Systems</u> (**SIGMETRICS**), Austin, TX, June 2014. [Slides (pptx) (pdf)] [Poster (pptx) (pdf)] [Full data sets]

The Efficacy of Error Mitigation Techniques for DRAM Retention Failures: A Comparative Experimental Study

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
*Intel Labs

Towards an Online Profiling System

Key Observations:

- Testing alone cannot detect all possible failures
- Combination of ECC and other mitigation techniques is much more effective
 - But degrades performance
- Testing can help to reduce the ECC strength
 - Even when starting with a higher strength ECC

Towards an Online Profiling System



Run tests periodically after a short interval at smaller regions of memory

Handling Variable Retention Time [DSN'15]

Moinuddin Qureshi, Dae Hyun Kim, Samira Khan, Prashant Nair, and Onur Mutlu,
 "AVATAR: A Variable-Retention-Time (VRT) Aware Refresh for DRAM
 Systems"

Proceedings of the <u>45th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on</u>
<u>Dependable Systems and Networks</u> (**DSN**), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 2015.
[Slides (pptx) (pdf)]

AVATAR: A Variable-Retention-Time (VRT) Aware Refresh for DRAM Systems

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Samira Khan[‡]

Prashant J. Nair[†] Onur Mutlu[‡]


[‡]Carnegie Mellon University

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
AVATAR


Insight: Avoid retention failures → Upgrade row on ECC error Observation: Rate of VRT >> Rate of soft error (50x-2500x)




AVATAR mitigates VRT by increasing refresh rate on error

RESULTS: REFRESH SAVINGS









AVATAR reduces refresh by 60%-70%, similar to multi rate refresh but with VRT tolerance

SPEEDUP



AVATAR gets 2/3rd the performance of NoRefresh. More gains at higher capacity nodes

ENERGY DELAY PRODUCT



AVATAR reduces EDP, Significant reduction at higher capacity nodes

Handling Data-Dependent Failures [DSN'16]

 Samira Khan, Donghyuk Lee, and Onur Mutlu,
 "PARBOR: An Efficient System-Level Technique to Detect Data-Dependent Failures in DRAM"

Proceedings of the <u>45th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on</u>
<u>Dependable Systems and Networks</u> (**DSN**), Toulouse, France, June 2016.
[Slides (pptx) (pdf)]

PARBOR: An Efficient System-Level Technique to Detect Data-Dependent Failures in DRAM

Samira Khan* Donghyuk Lee^{†‡} Onur Mutlu^{*†}
*University of Virginia [†]Carnegie Mellon University [‡]Nvidia *ETH Zürich

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Handling Data-Dependent Failures [MICRO'17]

 Samira Khan, Chris Wilkerson, Zhe Wang, Alaa R. Alameldeen, Donghyuk Lee, and Onur Mutlu,

"Detecting and Mitigating Data-Dependent DRAM Failures by Exploiting Current Memory Content"

Proceedings of the <u>50th International Symposium on Microarchitecture</u> (**MICRO**), Boston, MA, USA, October 2017.

[Slides (pptx) (pdf)] [Lightning Session Slides (pptx) (pdf)] [Poster (pptx) (pdf)]

Detecting and Mitigating Data-Dependent DRAM Failures by Exploiting Current Memory Content

Samira Khan* Chris Wilkerson[†] Zhe Wang[†] Alaa R. Alameldeen[†] Donghyuk Lee[‡] Onur Mutlu*

*University of Virginia [†]Intel Labs [‡]Nvidia Research *ETH Zürich

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
Handling Both DPD and VRT [ISCA'17]

- Minesh Patel, Jeremie S. Kim, and Onur Mutlu,
 "The Reach Profiler (REAPER): Enabling the Mitigation of DRAM Retention Failures via Profiling at Aggressive Conditions"
 Proceedings of the 44th International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA), Toronto, Canada, June 2017.
 [Slides (pptx) (pdf)]
 [Lightning Session Slides (pptx) (pdf)]
- First experimental analysis of (mobile) LPDDR4 chips
- Analyzes the complex tradeoff space of retention time profiling
- Idea: enable fast and robust profiling at higher refresh intervals & temperatures

The Reach Profiler (REAPER): Enabling the Mitigation of DRAM Retention Failures via Profiling at Aggressive Conditions

Minesh Patel^{§‡} Jeremie S. Kim^{‡§} Onur Mutlu^{§‡} ETH Zürich [‡]Carnegie Mellon University

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Leaky Cells



Periodic DRAM Refresh



Performance + Energy Overhead

The Reach Profiler (REAPER):

Enabling the Mitigation of DRAM Retention Failures via Profiling at Aggressive Conditions

Minesh Patel Jeremie S. Kim Onur Mutlu








Carnegie Mellon

Goal: find *all* retention failures for a refresh interval T > default (64ms)



Process, voltage, temperature

Variable retention time

Data pattern dependence


Characterization of 368 LPDDR4 DRAM Chips


1

Cells are more likely to fail at an increased (refresh interval | temperature)

2

Complex tradeoff space between profiling (speed & coverage & false positives)





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Reach Profiling

A new DRAM retention failure profiling methodology

+ Faster and more reliable than current approaches

+ Enables longer refresh intervals

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REAPER Outline

- 1. DRAM Refresh Background
- 2. Failure Profiling Challenges
- 3. Current Approaches
- 4. LPDDR4 Characterization
- **5.** Reach Profiling
- 6. End-to-end Evaluation

Experimental Infrastructure

368 2y-nm LPDDR4 DRAM chips

- 4Gb chip size
- From 3 major DRAM vendors


Thermally controlled testing chamber

- Ambient temperature range: {40°C 55°C} ± 0.25°C
- DRAM temperature is held at 15°C above ambient

LPDDR4 Studies


- 1. Temperature
- 2. Data Pattern Dependence
- 3. Retention Time Distributions
- 4. Variable Retention Time
- 5. Individual Cell Characterization

Long-term Continuous Profiling



- New failing cells continue to appear over time
 - Attributed to variable retention time (VRT)
- The set of failing cells changes over time


Long-term Continuous Profiling




Error correction codes (ECC) and online profiling are necessary to manage new failing cells


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
Single-cell Failure Probability (Cartoon)





Single-cell Failure Probability (Cartoon)

































REAPER Outline

- 1. DRAM Refresh Background
- 2. Failure Profiling Challenges
- 3. Current Approaches
- 4. LPDDR4 Characterization
- 5. Reach Profiling
- 6. End-to-end Evaluation


Reach Profiling

Key idea: profile at a *longer refresh interval* and/or a *higher temperature*



Reach Profiling

Key idea: profile at a *longer refresh interval* and/or a *higher temperature*



Reach Profiling

Key idea: profile at a *longer refresh interval* and/or a *higher temperature*

Pros

- Fast + Reliable: reach profiling searches for cells where they are most likely to fail

Cons

- False Positives: profiler may identify cells that fail under profiling conditions, but not under operating conditions

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Towards an Implementation

Reach profiling is a general methodology

3 key questions for an implementation:

What are desirable profiling conditions?

How often should the system profile?

What information does the profiler need?

Three Key Profiling Metrics

1. Runtime: how long profiling takes

2. Coverage: portion of all possible failures discovered by profiling

3. False positives: number of cells observed to fail during profiling but never during actual operation

Three Key Profiling Metrics

1. Runtime: how long profiling takes

2. Coverage: portion of all possible failures discovered by profiling

We explore how these three metrics change under **many** different profiling conditions

Evaluation Methodology

Simulators


- Performance: Ramulator [Kim+, CAL'15]
- Energy: DRAMPower [Chandrasekar+, DSD'11]


Configuration


- 4-core (4GHz), 8MB LLC
- LPDDR4-3200, 4 channels, 1 rank/channel

Workloads

- 20 random 4-core benchmark mixes
- SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite







Brute-force profiling





Ideal profiling

On average, REAPER enables:

16.3% system performance improvement 36.4% DRAM power reduction









REAPER enables longer refresh intervals, which are unreasonable using brute-force profiling

<u>nepronie</u>

rarely

Other Analyses in the Paper

Detailed LPDDR4 characterization data

- Temperature dependence effects
- Retention time distributions
- Data pattern dependence
- Variable retention time
- Individual cell failure distributions

Profiling tradeoff space characterization

- Runtime, coverage, and false positive rate
- Temperature and refresh interval
- Probabilistic model for tolerable failure rates
- Detailed results for end-to-end evaluations

REAPER Summary

Problem:

- •DRAM refresh performance and energy overhead is high
- •Current approaches to retention failure profiling are slow or unreliable

Goals:

- 1. Thoroughly analyze profiling tradeoffs
- 2. Develop a **fast** and **reliable** profiling mechanism

Key Contributions:

- 1. First detailed characterization of 368 LPDDR4 DRAM chips
- 2. Reach profiling: Profile at a longer refresh interval or higher temperature than target conditions, where cells are more likely to fail

Evaluation:

- •2.5x faster profiling with 99% coverage and 50% false positives
- •REAPER enables 16.3% system performance improvement and 36.4%

DRAM power reduction

•Enables longer refresh intervals that were previously unreasonable

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Handling Both DPD and VRT [ISCA'17]

- Minesh Patel, Jeremie S. Kim, and Onur Mutlu,
 "The Reach Profiler (REAPER): Enabling the Mitigation of DRAM Retention Failures via Profiling at Aggressive Conditions"
 Proceedings of the 44th International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA), Toronto, Canada, June 2017.
 [Slides (pptx) (pdf)]
 [Lightning Session Slides (pptx) (pdf)]
- First experimental analysis of (mobile) LPDDR4 chips
- Analyzes the complex tradeoff space of retention time profiling
- Idea: enable fast and robust profiling at higher refresh intervals & temperatures

The Reach Profiler (REAPER): Enabling the Mitigation of DRAM Retention Failures via Profiling at Aggressive Conditions

Minesh Patel^{§‡} Jeremie S. Kim^{‡§} Onur Mutlu^{§‡} ETH Zürich [‡]Carnegie Mellon University

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Main Memory Needs Intelligent Controllers for Reliability & Security

Understanding In-DRAM ECC

Minesh Patel, Jeremie S. Kim, Hasan Hassan, and Onur Mutlu, "Understanding and Modeling On-Die Error Correction in Modern DRAM: An Experimental Study Using Real Devices" Proceedings of the 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), Portland, OR, USA, June 2019.

[Source Code for EINSim, the Error Inference Simulator] **Best paper session.**

Understanding and Modeling On-Die Error Correction in Modern DRAM: An Experimental Study Using Real Devices

```
Minesh Patel^{\dagger} Jeremie S. Kim^{\ddagger\dagger} Hasan Hassan^{\dagger} Onur Mutlu^{\dagger\ddagger} ^{\dagger} ETH Zürich ^{\ddagger} Carnegie Mellon University
```

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Flip Side: Using Memory for Security

How to Use Memory Devices to Support Security

A Flip Side: Using Memory for Security

- Generating True Random Numbers (using DRAM)
 - □ Kim et al., HPCA 2019

- Evaluating Physically Unclonable Functions (using DRAM)
 - □ Kim et al., HPCA 2018

- Quickly Destroying In-Memory Data (using DRAM)
 - Orosa et al., arxiv 2019

D-RaNGe: Using Commodity DRAM Devices to Generate True Random Numbers with Low Latency and High Throughput

Ieremie S. Kim Minesh Patel Hasan Hassan

Lois Orosa **Onur Mutlu**

SAFARI

HPCA 2019

Carnegie Mellon



Executive Summary

- Motivation: High-throughput true random numbers enable system security and various randomized algorithms.
 - Many systems (e.g., IoT, mobile, embedded) do not have dedicated True
 Random Number Generator (TRNG) hardware but have DRAM devices
- **Problem**: Current DRAM-based TRNGs either
 - 1. do **not** sample a fundamentally non-deterministic entropy source
 - 2. are **too slow** for continuous high-throughput operation
- <u>Goal</u>: A novel and effective TRNG that uses **existing** commodity DRAM to provide random values with 1) **high-throughput**, 2) **low latency** and 3) no adverse effect on concurrently running applications
- <u>D-RaNGe:</u> Reduce DRAM access latency **below reliable values** and exploit DRAM cells' failure probabilities to generate random values
- Evaluation:
 - 1. Experimentally characterize 282 real LPDDR4 DRAM devices
 - 2. **D-RaNGe** (717.4 Mb/s) has significantly higher throughput (211x)
 - 3. **D-RaNGe (100ns)** has significantly lower latency (**180x**)

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Generating True Random Numbers

Jeremie S. Kim, Minesh Patel, Hasan Hassan, Lois Orosa, and Onur Mutlu,
 "D-RaNGe: Using Commodity DRAM Devices to Generate True
 Random Numbers with Low Latency and High Throughput"
 Proceedings of the 25th International Symposium on High-Performance
 Computer Architecture (HPCA), Washington, DC, USA, February 2019.
 [Slides (pptx) (pdf)]
 [Full Talk Video (21 minutes)]

D-RaNGe: Using Commodity DRAM Devices to Generate True Random Numbers with Low Latency and High Throughput

Jeremie S. Kim^{‡§} Minesh Patel[§] Hasan Hassan[§] Lois Orosa[§] Onur Mutlu^{§‡}
[‡]Carnegie Mellon University [§]ETH Zürich

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The DRAM Latency PUF:

Quickly Evaluating Physical Unclonable Functions by Exploiting the Latency-Reliability Tradeoff in Modern Commodity DRAM Devices

> <u>Jeremie S. Kim</u> Minesh Patel Hasan Hassan Onur Mutlu



HPCA 2018



QR Code for the paper

https://people.inf.ethz.ch/omutlu/pub/dram-latency-puf hpca18.pdf





Carnegie Mellon

Evaluating Physically Unclonable Functions

Jeremie S. Kim, Minesh Patel, Hasan Hassan, and Onur Mutlu,
 "The DRAM Latency PUF: Quickly Evaluating Physical Unclonable
 Functions by Exploiting the Latency-Reliability Tradeoff in
 Modern DRAM Devices"

Proceedings of the <u>24th International Symposium on High-Performance</u> <u>Computer Architecture</u> (**HPCA**), Vienna, Austria, February 2018.

[Lightning Talk Video]

[Slides (pptx) (pdf)] [Lightning Session Slides (pptx) (pdf)]

The DRAM Latency PUF:

Quickly Evaluating Physical Unclonable Functions by Exploiting the Latency-Reliability Tradeoff in Modern Commodity DRAM Devices

Jeremie S. Kim^{†§} Minesh Patel[§] Hasan Hassan[§] Onur Mutlu^{§†}

[†]Carnegie Mellon University [§]ETH Zürich

Quickly Destroying In-Memory Data

- Dataplant: In-DRAM Security Mechanisms for Low-Cost Devices
 - https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.07344.pdf

Dataplant: In-DRAM Security Mechanisms for Low-Cost Devices

```
Lois Orosa<sup>1</sup> Yaohua Wang<sup>1,2</sup> Ivan Puddu<sup>1</sup> Mohammad Sadrosadati<sup>1,3</sup> Kaveh Razavi<sup>1,4</sup> Juan Gómez-Luna<sup>1</sup> Hasan Hasan I Nika Mansouri-Ghiasi<sup>1</sup> Arash Tavakkol<sup>1</sup> Minesh Patel<sup>1</sup> Jeremie Kim<sup>1,5</sup> Vivek Seshadri<sup>6</sup> Uksong Kang<sup>7</sup> Saugata Ghose<sup>5</sup> Rodolfo Azevedo<sup>8</sup> Onur Mutlu<sup>1,5</sup>
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<sup>1</sup>ETH Zürich <sup>2</sup>National University of Defense Technology <sup>3</sup>Sharif University of Technology <sup>4</sup>Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam <sup>5</sup>Carnegie Mellon University <sup>6</sup>Microsoft <sup>7</sup>SK Hynix <sup>8</sup>UNICAMP
```

For Some Other Time ...

Using Commodity Memory Devices to Support Fundamental Security Primitives

Onur Mutlu

omutlu@gmail.com

https://people.inf.ethz.ch/omutlu

26 April 2019

IBM Research

SAFARI



Carnegie Mellon

Keeping Future Memory Secure

How Do We Keep Memory Secure?

- DRAM
- Flash memory
- Emerging Technologies
 - Phase Change Memory
 - STT-MRAM
 - RRAM, memristors
 - **...**

Solution Direction: Principled Designs

Design fundamentally secure computing architectures


Predict and prevent such safety issues

Architecting for Security

- Understand: Methods for vulnerability modeling & discovery
 - Modeling and prediction based on real (device) data and analysis
 - Understanding vulnerabilities
 - Developing reliable metrics
- Architect: Principled architectures with security as key concern
 - Good partitioning of duties across the stack
 - Cannot give up performance and efficiency
 - Patch-ability in the field
- Design & Test: Principled design, automation, (online) testing
 - Design for security
 - High coverage and good interaction with system reliability methods

Understanding Flash Memory Vulnerabilities

Understand and Model with Experiments (Flash)



[DATE 2012, ICCD 2012, DATE 2013, ITJ 2013, ICCD 2013, SIGMETRICS 2014, HPCA 2015, DSN 2015, MSST 2015, JSAC 2016, HPCA 2017, DFRWS 2017, PIEEE 2017, HPCA 2018, SIGMETRICS 2018]

NAND Daughter Board

Understanding Flash Memory Reliability



Proceedings of the IEEE, Sept. 2017

Error Characterization, Mitigation, and Recovery in Flash-Memory-Based Solid-State Drives

This paper reviews the most recent advances in solid-state drive (SSD) error characterization, mitigation, and data recovery techniques to improve both SSD's reliability and lifetime.

By Yu Cai, Saugata Ghose, Erich F. Haratsch, Yixin Luo, and Onur Mutlu

Understanding Flash Memory Reliability

Justin Meza, Qiang Wu, Sanjeev Kumar, and Onur Mutlu,
 "A Large-Scale Study of Flash Memory Errors in the Field"
 Proceedings of the ACM International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems (SIGMETRICS), Portland, OR, June 2015.

[Slides (pptx) (pdf)] [Coverage at ZDNet] [Coverage on The Register] [Coverage on TechSpot] [Coverage on The Tech Report]

A Large-Scale Study of Flash Memory Failures in the Field

Justin Meza
Carnegie Mellon University
meza@cmu.edu

Qiang Wu Facebook, Inc. qwu@fb.com

Sanjeev Kumar Facebook, Inc. skumar@fb.com Onur Mutlu Carnegie Mellon University onur@cmu.edu

NAND Flash Vulnerabilities [HPCA'17]

HPCA, Feb. 2017

Vulnerabilities in MLC NAND Flash Memory Programming: Experimental Analysis, Exploits, and Mitigation Techniques

Yu Cai[†] Saugata Ghose[†] Yixin Luo^{‡†} Ken Mai[†] Onur Mutlu^{§†} Erich F. Haratsch[‡]

†Carnegie Mellon University [‡]Seagate Technology [§]ETH Zürich

Modern NAND flash memory chips provide high density by storing two bits of data in each flash cell, called a multi-level cell (MLC). An MLC partitions the threshold voltage range of a flash cell into four voltage states. When a flash cell is programmed, a high voltage is applied to the cell. Due to parasitic capacitance coupling between flash cells that are physically close to each other, flash cell programming can lead to cell-to-cell program interference, which introduces errors into neighboring flash cells. In order to reduce the impact of cell-to-cell interference on the reliability of MLC NAND flash memory, flash manufacturers adopt a two-step programming method, which programs the MLC in two separate steps. First, the flash memory partially programs the least significant bit of the MLC to some intermediate threshold voltage. Second, it programs the most significant bit to bring the MLC up to its full voltage state.

In this paper, we demonstrate that two-step programming exposes new reliability and security vulnerabilities. We expe-

belongs to a different flash memory *page* (the unit of data programmed and read at the same time), which we refer to, respectively, as the least significant bit (LSB) page and the most significant bit (MSB) page [5].

A flash cell is programmed by applying a large voltage on the control gate of the transistor, which triggers charge transfer into the floating gate, thereby increasing the threshold voltage. To precisely control the threshold voltage of the cell, the flash memory uses incremental step pulse programming (ISPP) [12, 21, 25, 41]. ISPP applies multiple short pulses of the programming voltage to the control gate, in order to increase the cell threshold voltage by some small voltage amount (V_{step}) after each step. Initial MLC designs programmed the threshold voltage in one shot, issuing all of the pulses back-to-back to program both bits of data at the same time. However, as flash memory scales down, the distance between neighboring flash cells decreases, which

https://people.inf.ethz.ch/omutlu/pub/flash-memory-programming-vulnerabilities_hpca17.pdf

3D NAND Flash Reliability I [HPCA'18]

 Yixin Luo, Saugata Ghose, Yu Cai, Erich F. Haratsch, and Onur Mutlu, "HeatWatch: Improving 3D NAND Flash Memory Device Reliability by Exploiting Self-Recovery and Temperature-Awareness"

Proceedings of the <u>24th International Symposium on High-Performance</u> <u>Computer Architecture</u> (**HPCA**), Vienna, Austria, February 2018. [<u>Lightning Talk Video</u>]

[Slides (pptx) (pdf)] [Lightning Session Slides (pptx) (pdf)]

HeatWatch: Improving 3D NAND Flash Memory Device Reliability by Exploiting Self-Recovery and Temperature Awareness

```
Yixin Luo<sup>†</sup> Saugata Ghose<sup>†</sup> Yu Cai<sup>‡</sup> Erich F. Haratsch<sup>‡</sup> Onur Mutlu<sup>§†</sup> ^{\dagger} Carnegie Mellon University ^{\ddagger} Seagate Technology ^{\$} ETH Zürich
```

3D NAND Flash Reliability II [SIGMETRICS'18]

Yixin Luo, Saugata Ghose, Yu Cai, Erich F. Haratsch, and <u>Onur Mutlu</u>,
 <u>"Improving 3D NAND Flash Memory Lifetime by Tolerating Early Retention Loss and Process Variation"</u>

Proceedings of the <u>ACM International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems</u> (**SIGMETRICS**), Irvine, CA, USA, June 2018.

[Abstract]

[POMACS Journal Version (same content, different format)]
[Slides (pptx) (pdf)]

Improving 3D NAND Flash Memory Lifetime by Tolerating Early Retention Loss and Process Variation

Yixin Luo[†] Saugata Ghose[†] Yu Cai[†] Erich F. Haratsch[‡] Onur Mutlu^{§†}

[†]Carnegie Mellon University [‡]Seagate Technology [§]ETH Zürich

Another Talk: NAND Flash Memory Robustness

Yu Cai, Saugata Ghose, Erich F. Haratsch, Yixin Luo, and Onur Mutlu,
 "Error Characterization, Mitigation, and Recovery in Flash Memory Based Solid State Drives"

to appear in <u>Proceedings of the IEEE</u>, 2017.

Cai+, "Error Patterns in MLC NAND Flash Memory: Measurement, Characterization, and Analysis," DATE 2012.

Cai+, "Flash Correct-and-Refresh: Retention-Aware Error Management for Increased Flash Memory Lifetime," ICCD 2012.

Cai+, "Threshold Voltage Distribution in MLC NAND Flash Memory: Characterization, Analysis and Modeling," DATE 2013.

Cai+, "Error Analysis and Retention-Aware Error Management for NAND Flash Memory," Intel Technology Journal 2013.

Cai+, "Program Interference in MLC NAND Flash Memory: Characterization, Modeling, and Mitigation," ICCD 2013.

Cai+, "Neighbor-Cell Assisted Error Correction for MLC NAND Flash Memories," SIGMETRICS 2014.

Cai+,"Data Retention in MLC NAND Flash Memory: Characterization, Optimization and Recovery," HPCA 2015.

Cai+, "Read Disturb Errors in MLC NAND Flash Memory: Characterization and Mitigation," DSN 2015.

Luo+, "WARM: Improving NAND Flash Memory Lifetime with Write-hotness Aware Retention Management," MSST 2015.

Meza+, "A Large-Scale Study of Flash Memory Errors in the Field," SIGMETRICS 2015.

Luo+, "Enabling Accurate and Practical Online Flash Channel Modeling for Modern MLC NAND Flash Memory," IEEE JSAC 2016.

Cai+, "Vulnerabilities in MLC NAND Flash Memory Programming: Experimental Analysis, Exploits, and Mitigation Techniques," HPCA 2017.

Fukami+, "Improving the Reliability of Chip-Off Forensic Analysis of NAND Flash Memory Devices," DFRWS EU 2017.

Luo+, "HeatWatch: Improving 3D NAND Flash Memory Device Reliability by Exploiting Self-Recovery and Temperature-Awareness," HPCA 2018.

Luo+, "Improving 3D NAND Flash Memory Lifetime by Tolerating Early Retention Loss and Process Variation," SIGMETRICS 2018.

Cai+, "Error Characterization, Mitigation, and Recovery in Flash Memory Based Solid State Drives," Proc. IEEE 2017.

Two Other Solution Directions

There are Two Other Solution Directions

New Technologies: Replace or (more likely) augment DRAM

with a different technology

Non-volatile memories

Embracing Un-reliability:

Design memories with different reliability and store data intelligently across them

[Luo+ DSN 2014]

Aigorithm
Program/Language
System Software
SW/HW Interface
Micro-architecture
Logic
Devices
Electrons

...

Fundamental solutions to security require co-design across the hierarchy

Exploiting Memory Error Tolerance with Hybrid Memory Systems

Vulnerable data

Tolerant data

Reliable memory

Low-cost memory


On Microsoft's Web Search workload Reduces server hardware cost by 4.7 % Achieves single server availability target of 99.90 %

Heterogeneous-Reliability Memory [DSN 2014]


Heterogeneous-Reliability Memory




Step 1: Characterize and classify application memory error tolerance



Step 2: Map application data to the HRM system enabled by SW/HW cooperative solutions



Evaluation Results



More on Heterogeneous-Reliability Memory

Yixin Luo, Sriram Govindan, Bikash Sharma, Mark Santaniello, Justin Meza, Aman Kansal, Jie Liu, Badriddine Khessib, Kushagra Vaid, and Onur Mutlu, "Characterizing Application Memory Error Vulnerability to Optimize Data Center Cost via Heterogeneous-Reliability Memory"

Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), Atlanta, GA, June 2014. [Summary]
[Slides (pptx) (pdf)] [Coverage on ZDNet]

Characterizing Application Memory Error Vulnerability to Optimize Datacenter Cost via Heterogeneous-Reliability Memory

Yixin Luo Sriram Govindan* Bikash Sharma* Mark Santaniello* Justin Meza Aman Kansal* Jie Liu* Badriddine Khessib* Kushagra Vaid* Onur Mutlu Carnegie Mellon University, yixinluo@cs.cmu.edu, {meza, onur}@cmu.edu
*Microsoft Corporation, {srgovin, bsharma, marksan, kansal, jie.liu, bkhessib, kvaid}@microsoft.com

Conclusion

Summary: Memory Reliability & Security

- DRAM reliability is reducing
- Reliability issues open up security vulnerabilities
 - Very hard to defend against
- Rowhammer is a prime example
 - First example of how a simple hardware failure mechanism can create
 a widespread system security vulnerability
 - Its implications on system security research are tremendous & exciting
- Bad news: Memory reliability & security issues are getting worse.
- Good news: We have a lot more to do.
 - We are now fully aware hardware is easily fallible.
 - We are developing both attacks and solutions.
 - We are developing principled models, methodologies, solutions.

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For More on This Topic...

Onur Mutlu and Jeremie Kim,
 "RowHammer: A Retrospective"
 IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated
 Circuits and Systems (TCAD) Special Issue on Top Picks in Hardware and Embedded Security, 2019.
 [Preliminary arXiv version]

RowHammer: A Retrospective

Onur Mutlu^{§‡} Jeremie S. Kim^{‡§} §ETH Zürich [‡]Carnegie Mellon University

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And, An Older One...

Onur Mutlu,
 "Memory Scaling: A Systems Architecture
 Perspective"

Technical talk at <u>MemCon 2013</u> (**MEMCON**), Santa Clara, CA, August 2013. [Slides (pptx) (pdf)]
[Video] [Coverage on StorageSearch]

Memory Scaling: A Systems Architecture Perspective

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Fundamentally Secure, Reliable, Safe Computing Architectures

Main Memory Needs Intelligent Controllers

Memory Systems

and Memory-Centric Computing Systems

Lecture 3a: Memory Reliability & Security

Prof. Onur Mutlu

omutlu@gmail.com

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14 June 2019

TU Wien Fast Course 2019





Carnegie Mellon